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This study documents a general decline in the volatility of employment growth 
during the period 1956 to 2002 and examines its possible sources.  We use a panel design 
that exploits the considerable state-level variation in volatility during the period.  The 
roles of monetary policy, oil prices, industrial employment shifts and a coincident index 
of business cycle variables are explored.  Overall, these four variables taken together 
explain as much as 31 percent of the fluctuations in employment growth volatility.  
Individually, each of the four factors is found to have significantly contributed to 
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Understanding the determinants of economic volatility has long been a focus of 
macroeconomics.  Until recently, most attention has focused on understanding the 
average changes in volatility before and after the mid-1980s, that is, the Great 
Moderation (e.g., Kim and Nelson 1999, Stock and Watson 2002, and McConnell and 
Perez-Quiros 2000).  While the inter-period change in volatility that defined the Great 
Moderation was substantial, there were large movements in volatility within each of the 
two sub-periods as well.  For example, we estimate that employment growth volatility 
decreased by around 80% between 1958 and 1964.  In contrast, volatility grew by 450% 
from 1997 to 2002.  We believe much is to be gained by studying the macroeconomic 
forces that have underpinned changes in employment growth volatility throughout the 
past fifty years.  
While there is a large literature that examines the volatility pattern of aggregate 
economic variables and considers their determinants, there are few studies that use state-
level data to better understand the factors driving fluctuations in volatility.
1  In this 
regard, we first document the variations in employment growth volatility across states 
since the mid-1950s.  We then apply panel regression techniques to identify the 
underlying sources of the fluctuations in volatility.  The regressions are structured to 
capture the effects of three aggregate factors that have been identified as being important 
for understanding movements in volatility (monetary policy, oil price, and industrial 
structure).  In addition, we include a coincident index of other business cycle shocks.   
Overall, the four variables considered in this study explain 26% to 31% of the 
fluctuations in employment growth volatility during the period 1956 to 2002.  Each is 
                                                 
1Recent studies that used state-level data to examine volatility include Carlino et al (2003), Anderson and 
Vahid (2003), Owyang et al (2008), and Grennes et al (2010).   3
found to have contributed significantly to fluctuations in employment growth volatility, 
although to differing degrees.  In particular, after controlling for banking de-regulation 
we find that monetary policy accounts for roughly 8 to 10% of the variation in 
employment growth volatility.  By comparison, Stock and Watson (2002) attributed 20 to 
30%t of reduced volatility since the mid-1980s to improved monetary policy.  Thus, 
monetary policy’s role in accounting for the Great Moderation does not appear 
representative of its impact over the most of the postwar period.  The oil price index 
explains around 7 to 9% of the variation in employment growth volatility, the coincident 
index of business cycle shocks explains around 4 to 7%, and manufacturing’s share of 
total employment explains between 3 and 7%.   
Studies using aggregate data to examine volatility implicitly assume that the 
aggregate variables have identical effects across states, an assumption clearly rejected by 
the state-level data.  We find that allowing each of the macro variables to have state-
specific effects increases the estimated effects of these variables considerably. The 
overall contribution of the four macro variables when taken together is over 70% greater 
after allowing each of these variables to have separate state-level effects. 
The use of state-level data provides a number of other benefits.  A key benefit is 
the greater number of samples (48 for states compared with one in an aggregate study) 
and the corresponding additional dispersion that allows a more precise estimation of 
factors thought to influence fluctuations in volatility.  Another important benefit from 
using state data is the mitigation of endogeneity issues that can plague aggregate studies.  
For example, studies that attempt to attribute volatility changes to shifts in monetary 
policy need to separate the impacts of policy from the reaction of policymakers.  Since   4
monetary policy does not likely react to individual state-level developments, the issue of 
endogeneity is much less of a concern in a state-level analysis of volatility. 
Additionally, in regression studies of aggregate volatility, unobserved 
heterogeneity across states that affects volatility will be subsumed in the regression error 
term.  This unobserved state heterogeneity would lead to omitted variable bias if the error 
term is correlated with an included regressor.  State deregulation of banking markets is a 
relevant example of how such omitted variable bias might work.  Deregulation began in 
the late 1970s, the same period in which monetary policy was thought to have improved.  
Stock and Watson (2002), for example, attributed 20 to 30% of reduced volatility since 
the mid-1980s to improved monetary policy.  Yet financial deregulation itself could have 
led to greater aggregate stability, and so failure to control for the effect of deregulation on 
volatility can cause the contribution of monetary policy to be overstated.    Not all states 
deregulated their banking markets at the same time, and the staggered timing allows us to 
identify the effects of banking deregulation on volatility.   
 
1. MEASURING STATE-LEVEL EMPLOYMENT GROWTH VOLATILITY 
  We focus on employment growth because it is a widely used indicator of real 
activity at the state level, is available quarterly, and extends sufficiently far back in time 
to track longer-run movements in the series.  The data are seasonally adjusted quarterly 
nonagricultural payroll employment from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS).  Real 
state GDP was considered; however, consistent and reliable data are available beginning 
only in 1977, and only on an annual basis.  State personal income data exist for the entire 
period of our study but only in nominal terms.     5
  We measure state-level volatility using an approach similar to that in Morgan et al 
(2004).  Specifically, the quarterly growth rate of state employment (measured as log 
differences) is regressed on state dummies ( i a , where i indexes states) for the period 
1956:3 to 2004:2:  
  i,t 0 , Employment growth ii t aa    (1) 
   
Volatility is then measured as the absolute value of the regression error, 
  i,t , Volatility it    (2) 
        
which is measured as the deviation of employment growth in a given state-quarter from 
the average growth for a given state.
2  The estimated equation has an adjusted R
2 of 
0.0671.  F-tests indicate both that the state fixed effects are jointly significant (p = 0.00) 
and significantly different from each other (p = 0.00).   
  Figure 1 shows the average volatility of U.S. quarterly employment growth.
3  As 
can be seen, average employment growth volatility exhibits a general downward trend 
over time.  A simple regression of smoothed volatility on time produces a negative and 
highly significant coefficient.  Despite the general declining trend in average state 
employment growth volatility, there is considerable time variation in volatility around the 
trend, with volatility increasing dramatically in periods of recession (e.g., the early years 
of 2000). 
                                                 
2Alternatively, other researchers have computed volatilities using rolling standard errors or regression 
standard errors from rolling AR(1) models (e.g., Blanchard and Simon 2001).  However, the use of rolling 
standard errors complicates the panel estimation because it induces serial correlation in the data series.  
3 The volatility series shown in Figure 1 is constructed as the employment-weighted average of state 
volatilities, allowing the weights to change each quarter.  The volatility series is smoothed using a one-
sided four-quarter moving average.   6
Figure 2 contains a scatter plot of the levels and trends of the average volatility 
for individual states for the 1956:2 to 2002:4 period.  To calculate averages for each state 
we weight each state’s volatility in a year by the corresponding level of employment in 
that year.  State volatility trends were estimated using a weighted OLS regression of 
volatility on state-specific time trends.  Weights are state employment levels.  The 
vertical and horizontal lines on the graph indicate the cross-state means of each variable. 
Regarding the levels of volatility, the cross-state mean is 0.571 with a minimum 
of 0.425 in New York and a maximum of 0.859 in Michigan.  Five states (Michigan, 
Wyoming, West Virginia, Nevada, and Arizona) have average volatilities 25 to 50% 
greater than the average volatility.  Consistent with the cross-state average data, the 
volatility in each individual state has a downward trend during our sample period, with 
all but Wyoming’s being highly significant.  The data indicate that those states with the 
highest average levels of volatility tended to be those with the smallest percentage 
declines during the period of study. 
It has become popular to analyze volatility by focusing on the post-1984 years 
associated with the Great Moderation.  Studies have, for example, searched for trend 
breaks and have sought to identify the sources of the shift in volatility between the pre- 
and post-break periods.  Nevertheless, as seen in Figure 1, employment growth volatility 
fluctuates widely throughout the sample period, including within the time spans 
researchers identify as being pre- and post-break.  While volatility fell 75% between 1983 
and 1997, it also fell 80% between 1958 and 1964.  Similarly, Figure 1 shows that there 
are other periods in which volatility increased substantially.  This intra-period variation in   7
employment growth volatility is potentially helpful to analyses of the sources of 
fluctuations in volatility (e.g., Owyang et al 2008, and Grennes et al 2010). 
 
2. EMPIRICAL MODEL AND ESTIMATION 
Having documented the substantial and disparate declines in state employment 
growth volatility, we now turn  to an examination of the possible sources.  The fact that 
most states experienced volatility declines during the 1956-2005 sample period suggests 
that part of the variance might be due to common aggregate shocks.  A pooled cross-
section/time-series, or panel, model is useful in studying the determinants of changes in 
volatility.  The analysis of possible sources of fluctuations in volatility concentrates on a 
selection of factors that previous studies have found to be important.  These include 
monetary policy, oil prices, an index of coincident business cycle indicators, and changes 
in industrial structure.  Each of the four factors is measured at the aggregate level, but is 
permitted to have state-specific effects on volatility.
4  The models also incorporate state-
level controls to more precisely estimate the effects of the aggregate variables.  Controls 
include state fixed effects, state-specific time trends and dummy variables indicating 
quarters in which each state’s banking system was de-regulated.
5  State fixed effects 
account for time-invariant idiosyncratic state-level factors that can influence state 
                                                 
4 Although monetary policy, oil prices and other business cycle shocks are inherently macroeconomic, 
industrial structure can vary from state to state.  Anderson and Vahid (2003), and Grennes et al (2010) have 
found that state-specific changes in industrial structure alter the time-series profile of a state’s employment 
growth volatility.  We rely on an aggregate measure of industrial structure for consistency with the other 
factors examined. 
5 Morgan et al (2004) found that de-regulation significantly affected employment growth volatility, 
although they restricted de-regulation to have a single effect on all states.  Our analysis allows a state’s de-
regulation to have a unique effect on that state’s volatility.  In 1978, Maine was the first state to pass a law 
that allowed entry by bank holding companies from any state that reciprocated by allowing Maine banks to 
enter their banking markets.  Following Maine’s lead, states deregulated in waves, with the bulk of them 
approving legislation to allow deregulation between 1985 and 1988. With the exception of Hawaii, all 
states allowed interstate banking by 1993.   8
volatility, and state-specific time trends to capture slow-moving influences in each state 
(e.g., demographic change).  Banking de-regulation has been found to have its own 
significant effect on volatility (Morgan et al (2004)).  Additionally, periods of de-
regulation overlapped part of what several researchers have argued was a time of regime 
change in monetary policy.  Developing accurate estimates of monetary policy’s impact 
on volatility thus requires netting out whatever role de-regulation played. 
2.1 Empirical Specification 
The analysis uses a fixed effects panel data model to analyze quarterly data on 
state employment growth volatility.
6  The sample consists of quarterly data covering the 
period 1956 to 2002.
7  The sample contains 8,976 observations: 187 quarters of data for 
48 states.  Contemporaneous and lagged values of each explanatory variable are used to 
allow for delayed or persistent impacts.  
The panel design offers several empirical benefits.  First, it relies on 48 different 
data samples, as opposed to one when strictly aggregate data are used.  The panel also 
mitigates potential simultaneity problems, especially between monetary policy and 
volatility, because policymakers’ decisions are made using macro data and from the 
perspective of aggregate economic health.  An additional benefit is the ability to allow 
variables measured at the aggregate level to have state-specific effects.  Some studies 
have shown, for example, that monetary policy has differential state impacts (Carlino and 
DeFina (1998, 1999)).  Allowing cross-state variation in impacts potentially increases the 
variation in volatility explained by the aggregate variables since, in essence, an 
                                                 
6A Hausman test indicated that a two-way fixed effects specification, both for time and states, was 
preferred to a two-way random effects specification.   
7 The Bureau of Labor Statistics reported employment using the SIC classification until 2002 and on a 
NAICS basis thereafter.  Since there is no comprehensive concordance between SIC and NAICS, we use 
data only through 2002 for consistency.   9
identifying constraint is lifted from the data (i.e., the estimated coefficient on an 
aggregate variable is identical for all states.)  Finally, as just mentioned, a state-level 
panel allows us to effectively control for bank de-regulation and various other state 
developments that can be correlated with aggregate variables (e.g., monetary policy).   
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where: it   is volatility in quarterly employment growth fluctuations, measured as in 
equation (2); t indexes time (quarters); i indexes the 48 states; m  indexes the four 
aggregate-macroeconomic variables whose effects on volatility are to be estimated; n 
indexes lags; ; t is a time trend for each state;  , it dreg  is a dummy for state i, indicating 
quarters in which state banking was de-regulated; and, Xm indicates the m
th explanatory 
variable measured at the aggregate level.  The effects of the macro variables on state 
volatility are captured by interacting these variables with the state dummy variables.
8 
  The four macro explanatory variables are chosen to reflect their emphasis in the 
literature.  There has been longstanding interest in the impacts of monetary policy and oil 
price shocks in general, and special attention has been accorded to these variables in the 
recent literature seeking to explain swings in volatility (Clarida et al 2000, Orphanides 
2004, Leduc et al 2007, Stock and Watson 2002, Leduc and Sill 2007, and Hamilton, 
1983, 1996, and 2003).  Similarly, the effects of employment shifts away from 
manufacturing jobs has likewise been scrutinized [e.g., Blanchard and Simon (2001) and 
                                                 
8 The constant term measures the fixed effect for the omitted state, Georgia.  We include all 48 states when 
interacting the macro factors and the state fixed-effects since concerns about colinearity does not arise for 
the interacted variables.     10
McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2000).] In addition to these variables, we examine how 
other cyclical shocks might matter using a summary coincident business cycle index 
developed in Aruoba et al (2008), hereafter ADS.   
2.2 Variable Measurement   
  Monetary policy shocks are measured using the general strategy of Christiano et 
al (1999).  That is, we estimate a small VAR (described below) in which the federal funds 
rate is included as a policy instrument.  The structural errors from the federal funds rate 
equation are interpreted as shocks to monetary policy.  We then measure changes in 
monetary policy that are potential sources of more general economic volatility using the 
squared structural residuals.  The idea is that shifts in monetary policy manifest 
themselves as changes in the volatility of policy shocks.  To measure structural monetary 
policy shocks we employ a two-variable VAR that includes four lags of both the federal 
funds rate and the composite index of business cycle activity developed by ADS.  A 
recursive identification scheme is used with the ADS index ordered first.  Consequently, 
aggregate activity (the slow-moving variable) is assumed not to respond to monetary 
policy shocks within a quarter, while monetary policy (the fast-moving variable) 
responds to the aggregate activity within the quarter.   
  The ADS index is designed to track real macroeconomic activity at high 
frequency and has zero mean so that progressively more negative (positive) values 
indicate progressively weaker (stronger) business conditions. Its underlying economic 
indicators include weekly initial jobless claims, monthly payroll employment, industrial 
production, personal income less transfer payments, manufacturing and trade sales, and 
quarterly real GDP, and the index mixes high- and low-frequency information and stock   11
and flow dynamics.  For this analysis, we aggregate the weekly ADS index into quarterly 
values.   
   The oil price shock at time t is measured as the net oil price increase over the 
previous 12 months (Hamilton 2003). Denote the spot price of West Texas Intermediate 
oil as
o
t p .  The net oil price increase (
o
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This measure of oil-price shocks demonstrates a more stable link to real activity than 
does the actual price of crude oil over the postwar sample.  Industrial structure is 
measured as the ratio of manufacturing employment to total non-farm employment.  
Employment data are seasonally adjusted. 
  In addition to state fixed effects and state-specific time trends, we use a set of 
state-specific dummies to indicate when a state allowed interstate banking.  The dummies 
equal zero before a state experienced financial deregulation and unity otherwise.  The 
dates of state-level deregulation are from Morgan et al (2004).   
2.3 Estimation and Results 
    Prior to estimation, the variables in equation (3) were checked for non-
stationarity.  The null of non-stationarity could be rejected for employment growth 
volatility using the Im et al (2003) panel unit root test, which allows the unit root process 
for the state-specific variable to differ across states.  The monetary policy, oil price and 
coincident index variables are each stationary by construction, and so are used in their 
original level form in the estimations. (A formal ADF test for each of these variables 
using a trend and six lags easily rejects non-stationarity (p < 0.000).)  The share of total   12
employment in manufacturing was found to be non-stationary, and so the (stationary) 
first difference is used. 
  We begin by investigating the effect of the macro aggregate variables when each 
is restricted to have a common effect across states.  This is accomplished by including 
each macro factor without allowing them to have state-specific effects: 
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A series of regressions were run to determine the appropriate lag length for each macro 
variable.
9  Based on the results from these regressions, four lags of the oil-price variable, 
six lags of the monetary policy variable, three lags of the economic activity index and 
four lags of the change in the manufacturing share are used, along with their 
contemporaneous values. Equation (4) is estimated by OLS; the standard errors are 
corrected both for heteroskedasticity and serial correlation.   
 The second column of Table 1 reports the sum of the lag coefficients for each 
aggregate variable and in parentheses the Z-statistic for the test of the null hypothesis that 









   ).  We find that monetary policy variance has an insignificant long-run 
effect on employment growth volatility, while the other macro variables are significant at 
least at the 10% level.  Oil-price increases lead to increased employment growth 
                                                 
9 The usual AIC or BIC could not be used due to the panel structure of the data.  Instead we estimated 
equation (3) without the state interactions on the macro variables, using five lags of each macro variable 
and of the state manufacturing share.  State interactions are ignored so that average effect can be measured.  
The contemporaneous plus all lags up to the maximum significant lag for a variable were used.  For 
instance, if the fourth lag of the oil price was significant, the contemporaneous through the fourth lag were 
included in the estimation.   13
volatility, as does an increase in manufacturing share. An increase in the business cycle 
index leads to lower volatility, suggesting that when the aggregate economy is growing at 
an above average pace, employment growth volatility is low and vice versa.  We also test 
whether each of the aggregate variables can be excluded from equation (4) and report the 
results in column three of Table 1.  Specifically, we test the null hypothesis:
,1 0, 2 , 0 : m
m
m m nlag H       .  The test suggests that, with the exception of monetary 
policy, the macro variables have a significant effect on state employment growth 
volatility.   
We use equation (3) to estimate the state-specific effects of each macro variable.  
The equation is estimated by OLS; standard errors are corrected both for 
heteroskedasticity and serial correlation.  Estimation of equation (3) produced an R
2 = 
.3821.  Due to the large number of state interactions, lags, etc., results are summarized in 
the form of two sets of F-statistics.   The fourth column of Table 1 reports the F-statistic 
for the test that a given macro variable has the same influence on volatility across states.  
That is, we test the null hypothesis for the mth macro aggregate: 
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against the alternative hypothesis that state-specific responses to the particular macro 
variable differ.   
The fifth column of Table 1 reports the F-statistics for the test that state-specific 
responses to each macro variable, m, are jointly (i.e., across states) equal to zero:  
  0, ,
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against the alternative hypothesis that at least one state differs from zero. Based 
on the test results reported in columns 4 and 5 of Table 1, we find that the individual state 
responses to each of the four macro variables (monetary policy variance, oil-price index, 
business cycle index and change in manufacturing share) vary significantly across states 
(column 4 in Table 1) and have a jointly significant impact on employment growth 
volatility (column 5 in Table 1).   Note that in contrast to the results from the aggregate 
specification of equation (4), the variance of monetary policy is now highly significant 
once we allow policy to have differential effects across states.  We also find that the other 
macro aggregate variables have differential effects across states that are statistically 
significant.   
The joint significance of the deregulation dummies provides new support for the 
findings of Morgan et al (2004) in that the present model has considerably more controls 
than theirs. In addition, Morgan et al restricted deregulation to have the same effect on 
each state.  The results show that these restrictions are perhaps too strict, in that the null 
hypothesis of the equality of 48 estimated coefficients on the deregulation variable is 
soundly rejected.   
2.4 Accounting for Volatility   
We now turn to an exercise that accounts for the relative contribution of the 
macro factors and the state-specific factors on state employment growth volatility.  The 
contribution to volatility of the macro factor is determined by dropping the state fixed-
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The R
2 from this regression gives the upper bound for the contribution of the macro 
variables since all co-variance between them and the excluded state controls (fixed 
effects and state-specific time trends) is allocated to the aggregate factors.  We refer to 
the R
2 from equation (5) as
2
M R .  A second auxiliary regression that includes only the 
state-specific controls maximizes the measured contribution of these variables since all 
co-variance with the now excluded macro factors is ascribed to them: 
 
  0, , ,   ii i i ti t it td r e g          (6) 
 
The R
2 from equation (6) is called
2
S R . 
We present the goodness of fit statistics from estimating equations (3), (5), and (6) in 
Panel A of Table 2. The R
2 from the estimation of equation (3), referred to as
2
ALL R , 
indicates that all explanatory variables, both the macro variables and the state variables, 
explain 38% of the total variation in state-level employment growth volatility.  The value 
for 
2
S R indicates that the state-level variables explain at most 12.6% of the variation in 
employment growth volatility. The value for 
2
M R  indicates that the macro variables 
explain at most 31.3% of the variation.   
  To generate the lower bound estimate for the contribution of the macro variables 
we subtract
2
S R  from
2 . ALL R   The result of this calculation provides a lower bound estimate 
of 25.6%. Consequently, the range of contributions for the macro variables is from 25.6   16
to 31.3% of the total variation in employment growth volatility, which is reported in the 
second column of Panel B in Table 2.   
  Next, we calculate the individual contribution of each of the four macro variables 
using versions of equation (3) and equation (5) with only one macro variable at a time in 
each regression. Panel B of Table 2 reports the upper and lower bound contributions for 
each of the individual macro variables.  We find that monetary policy accounts for 
between 7.8 and 9.6% of the variation in volatility.  This range falls well below the 
estimated explanatory power of monetary policy found by others who have examined the 
post-1984 decline in GDP volatility, e.g., Leduc and Sill (2007).  Those estimates fall in 
the 15 to 20% range. The oil-price index explains around 6.7 to 8.6%, the aggregate 
activity index explains around 4.1 to 7.2%, and the manufacturing share change explains 
between 3.3 and 7.4%.   
As already noted, the ability to control for banking deregulation is potentially 
important, especially for measuring the effects of monetary policy.  The third column of 
Panel B, Table 3 provides some evidence on the issue.  Essentially, the same procedures 
used to generate the estimates in column 2 of Panel B were used, except that the banking 
deregulation controls were removed from all estimated equations.  The results show that 
the estimates of monetary policy’s impact are indeed overstated when the deregulation 
controls are removed.  Without the deregulation controls, the lower bound of the range 
for policy’s impact is about 30% higher and the upper end is about 11% higher.  The 
impacts of removing the controls for banking deregulation are much less dramatic for the 
other macro variables.   17
It was also noted that the panel design allows each of the macro variables to have 
state-specific effects.  It is possible to estimate the importance of this aspect of the 
estimation following the foregoing methodology.  That is, the models can be re-estimated 
without allowing for state-specific interactions, the range of contributions of each 
variable can be calculated and these ranges can be compared to those allowing state-
specific effects.  The results of this exercise (not shown) indicate that allowing state-
specific effects substantially increases the estimated contributions of each variable.  For 
example, the combined effects of all the macro variables is close to 72% greater using the 
state interactions compared to when the variables are constrained to have the same cross-
state effect.  The estimated impact of monetary policy alone is about 32% greater.  
Consequently, the use of state-level data appears to have important implications for 
research in this area and future research would benefit from greater reliance on it.  
 
3. CONCLUSION 
This study documents a general decline in the volatility of employment growth since 
the mid-1950s and examines its possible sources.  We studied several potential sources of 
volatility that have received attention in the literature on volatility, i.e.,  monetary policy, 
oil prices, changes in industrial structure and other business cycle shocks.  A unique 
aspect of our analysis is the use of state-level panel data on employment growth to 
examine how each of these variables affected employment growth volatility.  Panel data 
allow a richer analysis than one based only on time series data (e.g., Stock and Watson 
2002) or alternatively on cross-sectional data (e.g., Hammond and Thompson 2004).  
This includes the benefits of greater data variation, decreased simultaneity and the ability 
to allow variables measured at the aggregate level to have state-specific affects. State-  18
level data also permitted us to control for the effects of state banking deregulation, which 
has been found to have significant effects on employment growth volatility and could be 
correlated with monetary policy, thus confounding efforts at identifying policy’s effects. 
Our analysis indicates that each of these factors has played a significant role in 
explaining fluctuations in employment growth volatility, and that each had significantly 
different effects across the states.  Monetary policy had the largest measured effects, 
accounting for between 8 and 10% of the variation in volatility.  These estimates are 
noticeably lower than others based only on the change in volatility pre- and post- the 
Great Moderation.  Our estimates indicate that changes in industrial structure had a 
significant impact and could explain up to about 7% of the variation in volatility in the 
sample period.   
The evidence also demonstrates the importance of controlling for banking de-
regulation, consistent with the results of Morgan et al (2004).  Allowing aggregate-level 
variables to have state-specific effects is also found to be crucial.  We presented evidence 
that doing so increases the estimated contributions considerably; indeed, the overall 
contribution of the four macro variables was close to 72% higher.  We think the evidence 
described in this paper suggests that future research would benefit from increased 
reliance on regional data, rather than using only aggregate-level data.  Future research 
might also consider the possible roles played by other factors, such as shocks to 
productivity growth, foreign trade and fiscal policy.  All such variables can be analyzed 
within the framework developed here and could offer additional clues to the factors 
driving volatility. 
   19
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Table 1: F-tests for the Estimated Coefficients 
  F-tests for aggregates
†  F-tests for individual state-
specific sums 
  Sum of lag 
coefficients
a  Exclusion test
b  Equal across 
states
c  Exclusion test
d 







0.93 2.48*** 2.46*** 
Oil Price Index  0.086 
(4.3)***  12.94*** 3.97*** 4.04*** 
Business Cycle Index  -0.006 




(1.75)*  1.93* 2.99*** 3.02*** 
Banking De-
regulation Dummies  N/A N/A  2.09*** 2.06*** 
†F statistics are calculated by dividing the reported χ
2 statistic by the degrees of freedom.   
*,**,*** indicates p- values <.1, <.05, and <.01, respectively.   








  in equation (4) 
bF-statistic for 
,1 0, 2, 0 :
m mm n l a g H        in equation (4) 
 








     in equation (3) 
dIn equation (3), the F-statistic for  0, ,
1







    
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Table 2:  The Contribution of Variables to  
Employment Volatility
a 





    
Full Equation  
2
All R 0.3821  Equation (3) 
Aggregate Variables Only 
2
M R  0.3128  Equation (5) 
State Controls Only 
2
S R 0.1264  Equation (6) 
Panel B 
Variable   % Contribution to Volatility
(with deregulation controls)
% Contribution to Volatility 
(no deregulation controls) 
All Macro Variables  25.6 to 31.3   26.7 to 31.3  
Monetary Policy Variance  7.8 to 9.6    
10.2 to 10.7  
Oil Price Index  6.7 to 8.6    
6.8 to 9.0  
Business Cycle Index  4.1 to 7.2    
3.9 to 4.2  
Manufacturing Share 
Change  3.3 to 7.4    
3.3 to 7.9  
a Aggregate variables include monetary policy, oil prices, the ADS business cycle index and change in 
manufacturing employment share, all interacted with state dummy variables.  The state controls include 
state fixed effects, state-specific time trends and state banking deregulation dummy variables.   23
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Four-quarter moving avergage of employment growth volatility.









































































Note: Average state volatility is calculated by weighting a state's volatility in each year by state employment
levels.  State volatility trends are estimated using an employment-weighted OLS regression of volatility
on state-specific time trends.  The vertical and horizontal lines on the graph indicate the cross-state means
of average volatility and the trend in volatility, respectively.
(1956:1 to 2002:4)
Figure 2: State Employment Growth Volatility Average and Trend